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NEPA PRE-EMPTION LEGISLATION: 
DECISIONMAKING ALTERNATIVE FOR CRUCIAL 
FEDERAL PROJECTS 
Randall L. Taylor* 
For the greater part of American history the government and 
citizenry of the United States paid little heed to the disruption and 
deterioration of the natural environment. Thoughtlessly clinging to 
the concept of the "frontier," the Ultimate West of inexhaustible 
freedom, space and natural resources, I they viewed the world as a 
never-empty cornucopia to be enjoyed without the burdens of stew-
ardship for future generations. 2 The immediate and exclusive appro-
priation of natural resources conferred great financial gain upon the 
taker, thus encouraging increased exploitation of "common re-
sources."3 The Industrial Revolution, in turn, created countless 
tangible benefits as the products of its new technology, yet left as 
its by-product an unprecedented disruption of the natural environ-
ment. 4 
In the 1960's, government and citizens alike realized that the 
frontier perspective and industrialization had synthesized to pro-
* J.D., U.C.L.A. School of Law, 1977. 
I F. Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History (1960) (academic re-
print). 
2 One obvious example is the "slash and burn" agriculture practiced by the American 
settlers. 
3 Hardin describes this economic phenomenon as the "problem of the commons." Briefly 
stated, the problem of the commons is that the co-owner of a natural resource (a forest, for 
example) acquires personal economic gain by his immediate consumption of the entire re-
source before his fellow owners (including future generations) begin to deplete the whole. In 
the case of the forest, the logger who clears the lumber stands to realize an enormous profit, 
while his fellows who delay their operations will not share in the economic value of the forest. 
Consequently, the forester has a financial incentive to consume everyone's share and a disin-
centive to forego consumption or conserve. For a more thorough discussion of the problem of 
the commons, see Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 163 SCIENCE 1245 (1968). 
• The relationship between technological advances and environmental disruption has been 
described in B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE 141-42 (Bantam ed. 1972). 
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duce a threat to the environment of emergency proportions. The 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)5 was enacted 
in an attempt to remedy this deficiency.6 NEPA requires all federal 
agencies which recommend major projects having a significant im-
pact upon the human environment to consider the environmental 
consequences of their actions.7 NEPA enforcement is accomplished 
through the courts. 
Although NEPA was a needed response to the environmental cri-
sis, the suitability of its prescribed procedures to all environmental 
disputes can be questioned. The magnitude of the environmental 
problem spotlights critical deficiencies in the litigation method of 
policing environmental controversies and often proves the courts 
unsatisfactory vehicles for NEP A enforcement. A mechanism which 
would remove environmental decisionmaking from the courts is 
needed where vital and large-scale federal projects are at issue. 
This article recommends pre-emption legislation as the best 
method for resolving major environmental controversies. Pre-
emption legislation is action by Congress which determines environ-
mental disputes without resort to judicial review. Its advantages 
include enormous savings of time and expense, increased expertise 
in environmental decisionmaking, and continued public input in 
major federal policymaking. 
I. NEPA's MANDATE 
In the words of its sponsor, Senator Henry Jackson, NEPA was 
designed to establish "a national strategy for the management ofthe 
human environment."8 As the Senator astutely observed, "[w]hat 
we should be doing is setting up institutions and procedures de-
signed to anticipate environmental problems."9 NEPA's preamble, 
• National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970). 
• Realizing that many of the activities causing substantial destruction of the environment 
are major federal projects which frequently have interstate or even national effects, Congress 
decided that the first target for environmental reform would be the federal agencies. At the 
same time, however, Congress hoped that the states might choose to emulate this federal 
reform. This hope has proven to be well-founded, as many states have adopted their own 
NEPA-type legislation. See Comment, Emerging State Programs to Protect the Environ-
ment: "Little NEPA's" and Beyond, 5 ENv. AFr. 567 (1976); cf. Hagman, NEPA's Progeny 
Inhabit The States-Were the Genes Defective? 7 URB. L. ANN. 3 (1974). 
1 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). 
8 Hearings on S. 1075, & S. 1752 Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1969). 
• Id. at 27. 
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the congressional declaration of the national environmental policy, 
reflects these goals. 
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on 
the interrelations of all components of the natural environment, ... 
and recognizing further the critical importance of restoring and main-
taining environmental quality to the overall welfare and development 
of man, declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal 
Government, ... to create and maintain conditions under which man 
and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, eco-
nomic, and other requirements of present and future generations of 
Americans. 10 
NEPA's most significant provision, Section 102(2)(C), directs 
every agency of the Federal Government to "include in every recom-
mendation or report on ... major federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed state-
ment ... on-(i) the environmental impact of the proposed 
action."11 This provision mandated the now familiar "environmen-
tal impact statement" or EIS as an integral part of agency planning. 
Indeed, it requires an EIS for every major federal action. 12 In order 
to encourage federal agencies to "utilize a systematic, interdisci-
plinary approach"13 to environmental decisionmaking, Congress 
required that specific information be included in these impact state-
ments. 
The EIS must be a detailed discussion of the environmental im-
pacts of the proposed action, including its unavoidable adverse con-
sequences and its irreversible commitments of natural resources. 14 
The agency preparing a particular EIS must investigate the rela-
tionship between the short-term use of natural resources and the 
long-range environmental quality of the project area.15 In addition, 
NEP A requires that the statement provide significant information 
concerning possible alternative courses of action. 16 Strict adherence 
to these procedures was intended to ensure that environmental vari-
ables would take their appropriate position amongst economic and 
technical variables in the agency decisionmaking process. 17 
I. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1970) (emphasis added). 
II [d. at 4332(2)(C) (emphasis added). 
12 [d. 
13 [d. § 4332(2)(A). 
14 [d. § 4332(2)(C)(v). 
15 [d. § 4332(2)(C)(iv). 
" [d. § 4332(2)(C;ljii). 
17 [d. § 4332(2)(B). 
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Congress left important questions unanswered, however. It is un-
clear how exhaustive an environmental impact analysis must be in 
order to comply with the procedural requirements of NEPA.18 More 
importantly, NEPA fails to state how the environmental conse-
quences revealed in the EIS must affect the decisionmaking process. 
The substantive sufficiency of an EIS will depend on the agency's 
balancing of environmental and other variables. This substantive 
decision will, in turn, determine whether the agency will proceed 
with the proposed action. Because of congressional silence, judicial 
review has attained critical significance in determining the require-
ments of substantive sufficiency. 
n. SUBSTANTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW 
EIS litigation has been voluminous.19 Although a large number of 
cases have determined which classes of agency decisions constitute 
major federal actions subject to §102(2)(C)20 and what procedures 
an agency must follow when preparing a final impact statement, 21 
few decisions have discussed the substantive sufficiency of an EIS. 
The general test of EIS adequacy is a two-pronged standard: one, 
whether all of the §102(2)(C) procedures have been met; and two, 
whether the substantive decision was properly within the discretion 
of the agency.22 The courts' application of this two-pronged test has 
demanded strict compliance with the procedural rules of 
§102(2)(C).23 The courts recognize that NEPA is an environmental 
\8 See Friedman, The Operational Impact of NEPA and Related Environmental Laws, 
Regulations and Orders on Mineral Operations, 19 RoCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 47 (1974). 
" C{. Yarrington, Judicial Review of Substantive Agency Decisions: A Second Generation 
of Cases Under The National Environmental Policy Act, 19 S.D. L. REV. 279 (1974). 
20 Comment, Evolving Judicial Standards under the National Environmental Policy Act 
and the Challenge of the Alaska Pipeline, 81 YALE L.J. 1592, 1597 (1972). (Hereinafter cited 
as Judicial Standards). 
21 See cases cited in Lynch, Complying with NEPA: The Tortuous Path To An Adequate 
Environmental Impact Statement, 14 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1972). 
" Cases which have utilized the two-pronged approach include National Helium Corp. v. 
Morton, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974); Concerned About 
Trident v. Schlesinger, 400 F. Supp. 154 (D.D.C. 1975); Essex County Preservation Ass'n v. 
Campbell, 399 F. Supp. 208 (D. Mass. 1975); Conservation Soc. of Southern Vermont v. 
Secretary of Transp., 362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973); Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. 
Supp. 401 (D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 484 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1973). 
23 National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973); Concerned About 
Trident v. Schlesinger, 400 F. Supp. 154 (D.D.C. 1975); Conservation Soc. of Southern Ver-
mont v. Secretary of Transp., 362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973); Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 
359 F. Supp. 404 (D. Va. 1973). Courts which have not explicitly adopted the two-pronged 
test also require strict procedural compliance, and this appears to be the general view. See, 
e.g., National Wildlife Federation v. Morton, 393 F. Supp. 1286, 1296 (D. D.C. 1975), holding 
that procedural duties must be fulfilled to the "fullest extent possible," a high standard which 
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"full disclosure law,"24 and they insist that the agency take a "hard 
look"25 at the environmental impact of the proposed project. 
On the other hand, the substantive contents of an EIS are tested 
by a far less rigorous standard. One court has held that NEP A 
creates no judicially enforceable duties,28 but most courts have de-
termined that the Act establishes sufficiently definite standards to 
permit meaningful, though limited, judicial review of the substan-
tive environmental decisions of federal agencies. 'E1 
The courts weigh several factors in determining the substantive 
adequacy of a given EIS, including the purpose underlying the im-
pact statement requirement,28 the practicability and reasonableness 
of including additional data,21 the extent of compliance with the 
procedural requirements of § 102(2)(C),30 the immediacy or remote-
ness of the threatened environmental harm,31 the cost-benefit anal-
ysis actually conducted by the decisionmaking agency,32 objective 
good faith,33 and the existence of undiscussed possibilities for miti-
gation of harm.34 Substantive compliance, however, is not subjected 
to strict review. Generally, an agency's decision will be overturned 
only if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary 
to law."35 This lenient standard has been expressly adopted in a 
number of cases,38 followed by implication in a few others,37 and 
will be vigorously enforced by the courts. But see Westside Property Owners v. Schlesinger, 
415 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Ariz. 1976), where only "reasonable compliance" was required . 
.. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1338 (D. Tex. 1973). 
2. Movement Against Destruction v. Trainor, 400 F. Supp. 533 (D. Md. 1975). This decision 
explained that an agency need not accumulate the sum total of scientific knowledge about 
the environmental impact of the proposed project. [d. at 522 . 
.. Bucklein v. Volpe, 1 E.L.R. 2Q043, 2 Envt'l Rep. Cases 1082 (N.D. Cal. 1970). 
'" E.g., Boone v. Tollatoba Creek Drainage Dist., 379 F. Supp. 1239 (D. Mass. 1974) . 
.. Chelsea Neighborhood Associations v. U.S. Postal Service, 516 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1975). 
2. Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 
1974). The "rule of reason" test applies to this question; Concerned About Trident v. Schles-
inger, 400 F. Supp. 454 (D.D.C. 1975). 
38 Sierra Club v. Morton, 379 F. Supp. 1254 (D. Colo. 1974). 
31 Basin Land Protection Ass'n v. Kleppe, 417 F. Supp. 46 (D. Wash. 1976). 
32 National Wildlife Federation v. Morton, 393 F. Supp. 1286 (D.D.C. 1975). 
33 Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F. Supp. 813 (D. Fla. 1975). 
34 Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (D. Tex. 1973) . 
.. Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1974). 
3. Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976); Harlem Valley Transp. Ass'n v. Stafford, 500 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 
1974); Brown v. Callaway, 497 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1974); Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 
F.2d 460 (9th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974); Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 
359 F. Supp. 404 (D. Va. 1973), aft'd, 484 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense 
Fund, Inc. v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 974 (1974), reh. 
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employed in conjunction with a requirement of "good faith" in sev-
eral more.38 
Since the final decision to go ahead with a major federal action 
should be legislative rather than judicial, the courts should not be 
the final arbiter' and judicial review should be limited.40 Given that 
reviewing courts measure the substantive adequacy of a NEPA 
statement by so lax a standard, whether there is presently any 
meaningful substantive review of impact statements is highly ques-
tionable. Indeed, a few federal courts have refused to examine EIS 
substance at aU.41 Where substantive review is so diluted as to be 
virtually non-existent, and courts are merely ensuring procedural 
denied, 419 U.S. 1041 (1974) (holding also that a "clearly erroneous" test is inappropriate); 
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973); First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Richard-
son, 484 F.2d 1369 (7th Cir. 1973); Baxley v. Corps of Engineers of U.S. Army, 411 F. Supp. 
1261 (D. Ala. 1976); Arkansas Community Organization for Reform Now v. Brinegar, 398 F. 
Supp. 685 (D. Ark. 1975), atl'd, 531 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1976); Chelsea Neighborhood Associa-
tions v. U.S. Postal Service, 516 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1975); Minnesota Public Interest Research 
Group v. Butz, 401 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Minn. 1975) (also noting that the Forest Service had 
acted within the scope of its authority). 
37 Westside Property Owners v. Schlesinger, 415 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Ariz. 1976) (the judici-
ary should ensure that NEPA's required methodology is followed, rather than provide a forum 
for the expression of substantive disagreements). See also Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 
1280 (8th Cir. 1976); Brooks v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1975); Daly v. Volpe, 514 F.2d 
1106 (9th Cir. 1975) (all using a "not clearly erroneous" test). 
311 National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 4B6 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973) (requiring objective good 
faith compliance and reasonable discussion of the subject matter); Conservation Soc'y of 
Southern Vermont v. Secretary of Transp., 362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973) (the substantive 
decision must be consistent with a good faith weighing of the proposed project's environmen-
tal impact); Concerned About Trident v. Schlesinger, 400 F. Supp. 454 (D.D.C. 1975) (requir-
ing full, good faith consideration and a balancing of environmental factors); Duke City Lum-
ber Co. v. Butz, 382 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. 1974). 
Courts frequently employ "cost-benefit" language in their discussion of the "arbitrary and 
capricious" test. One interesting formulation appears in Patterson v. Exxon, 415 F. Supp. 
1276 (D. Neb. 1976), a burden of proof opinion holding that, in the absence of evidence in 
the EIS that the actual cost-benefits balance struck by the agency was arbitrary or based on 
insufficient weight awarded environmental values, a court will examine only NEPA's proce-
dural requirements. Accord, Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813 (D. Fla. 1975) , wherein the 
court also utilized the standard arbitrary and capricious measure, as well as some "clear 
disregard of the evidence" language-truly a gatling gun approach. Simpler formulations may 
be found in Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 401 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Minn. 
1975); and Concerned About Trident v. Schlesinger, 400 F. Supp. 424 (D.D.C. 1975). 
31 Patterson v. Exxon, 415 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Neb. 1976) . 
.. Concerned About Triden~ v. Schlesinger, 400 F. Supp. 424 (D.D.C. 1975). 
~1 Under this view, a court must determine whether §102(2)(C) procedures have been 
followed, but cannot rule on the impact statement's substantive adequacy. Columbia Basin 
Land Protection A88'n v. Kleppe, 417 F. Supp. 46 (D. Wash. 1976); Upper West Fork River 
Watershed A88'n v. Corps of U.S. Army Engineers, 414 F. Supp. 908 (D. W.Va. 1976); E88ex 
County Preservation Ass'n v. Campbell, 399 F. Supp. 208 (D. Mass. 1975); Burleigh v. 
Calloway, 362 F. Supp. 121 (D. Hawaii 1973). 
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compliance with NEPA, the national interest might best be served 
by wholly eliminating the lengthy and expensive delay of substan-
tive sufficiency litigation. Congress should not be timid about ex-
pressly curtailing judicial review in this area. 
lll. DEFICIENCIES IN JUDICIAL RESOLUTIONS OF NEPA CONTROVERSIES 
Even if the courts were to apply a stricter standard in evaluating 
substantive compliance with NEPA, the propriety of the judiciary 
as the nation's environmental decisionmaker is questionable. Liti-
gation is costly and time-consuming}2 In addition, environmental 
litigation has two characteristics which aggravate the societal cost 
of employing the judicial model of dispute resolution: complexity 
and delay. Environmental disputes are inherently difficult cases, 
usually involving well-researched and technically detailed scientific 
testimony.43 Moreover, the interdependency of environmental varia-
bles increases the complexity of EIS disputes. Environmental prob-
lems have been described as "polycentric" because they require "a 
complex of decisions, judgment upon each of which depends upon 
the judgment to be made upon each of the others. "44 
The delay inherent in the litigation process also jeopardizes the 
validity of environmental decisions. Inflation, shifting demands for 
natural resources, changes in the populations of flora and fauna, 
international developments, economic variables, and other factors 
can make a given EIS obsolete. Clearly, NEPA's goal of intelligently 
balanced federal planning is frustrated where litigation invalidates 
an EIS not by rule of law, but by passage of time. 45 
.2 EIS substantive litigation might involve: (1) petitions for a temporary restraining order 
or preliminary injunction; (2) detailed discovery, testimony, and trial on the merits; (3) 
appeals to the appropriate circuit court of appeals;- and (4) requests for hearings before the 
United States Supreme Court. The TAPS litigation involved a case history even more compli-
cated. See Section IV, infra. 
43 Mid-Shiawassee County Concerned Citizens v. Train, 408 F. Supp. 650 (D. Mich. 1976), 
refers to "opposing scientific evidence" and requires the inclusion of all "responsible scientific 
opinion concerning adverse environmental effects." 408 F. Supp. at 656. As a practical mat-
ter, however, private corporations which file impact statements will disclose all available 
studies and testimonies in the EIS and refute those which are unfavorable to the project; 
omissions cast the EIS into disrepute and create the opportunity for judicial rejection on the 
ground of procedural inadequacy. Conversation with Frank Friedman, General Counsel, At-
lantic Richfield Corporation . 
.. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 22 (tent. ed. 1958) . 
•• The Trans-Alaska Pipeline project is again a case in point. During the course of the 
lengthy Wilderness Society litigation (Section IV, infra), the formation of the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the promulgation of national ambient air 
quality standards served to increase substantially the price of Alaskan crude, 80 that the 
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The present system of judicial review can be justified only if the 
judiciary is uniquely able to moderate environmental disputes. Yet, 
the courts frequently lack the requisite expertise to handle complex 
environmental controversies. At least one judicial opinion has recog-
nized this problem.4• A California court dismissed a class action 
brought on behalf of Los Angeles County against 291 alleged pollu-
ters, holding that "a court of equity lacks the facilities or compe-
tency to undertake the problem of abating air pollution within the 
Los Angeles Basin. "47 The court stated: 
It is readily apparent that the control of the emission of air pollutants 
is a highly complex problem. Our industrialized civilization is depen-
dent upon energy derived from the oxidation of fossilized fuels. Many 
industrial processes involve the release directly or indirectly of volatile 
substances which can cause discomfort to others. Such unavoidable 
discomfort is one of the prices one pays for living in an industrialized 
civilization. The court does not have the facilities to undertake the 
balancing of the interests of the inhabitants of the Los Angeles Basin 
against the needs of productive industry in this same area .... 48 
In order to deal with this lack of competence, special means of 
assisting the courts in environmental disputes have been suggested. 
The National Academy of Sciences recommends that courts appoint 
public agencies as "masters in chancery" to assist with the technical 
aspects of environmental litigation .• 8 Expert advisors such as econo-
mists, engineers, administrators, and community leaders also could 
aid the courts. 50 Even specialized courts of environmental law have 
been proposed. 51 
Whether even a speedy and capable judiciary should be making 
major environmental policy decisions is doubtful. In America's tri-
present West Coast demand for Prudhoe oil is far smaller than it was in 1970. See generally 
Corrigan, Now That the Pipeline's Almost Built, Who's Going to Take the Oil?, NAT'L J. 1762 
(Dec. 11, 1976) . 
.. Diamond v. General Motors Corp., No. 947429 (Los Angeles, Cal. Super. Ct.), dismissed, 
Aug. 20, 1969, appeal docketed, Civ. No. 36600, 2d Dist. Ct. App., Oct. 15, 1969. 
" Id. 
II Id. 
a J. KRIER & R. STEWARD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND POLICY at IV-137 (tent. rev. ed. 1976), 
citing NATIONAL ACADEMY or SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WASTE MANAGEMENT AND 
CONTROL 233-34 (1975). Such a solution, valid as it may be in many types of pollution 
litigation, is obviously precluded in NEPA cases, since those agencies which could best assist 
the court are the very ones which have prepared the EIS under examination . 
.. KRIER & STEWART, supra note 49, at IV-137. Judge Harold Leventhal has made similar 
suggestions. See Leventhal, Environmental Decision Making and the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. 
REv. 509 (1974) . 
• , KRIER & STEWART, supra note 49, at IV-l36. 
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parted system of government, such major decisions should be made, 
at least in theory, by the legislative branch. Important questions of 
national and international impact are not "reducible to courtroom 
dialectic and resolution."52 As one commentator has noted, "it is 
inappropriate for the judicial institution to make a substantive de-
termination about the use and protection of air. That choice is 
properly made, if at all, in the representative bodies of government, 
as the policy choice of those represented. "53 
In sum, the ability of the courts to handle major environmental 
issues with economy, efficiency, and the proper level of expertise, 
is in serious question. Faced with the risks which courtroom delay 
poses, and recognizing that case-by-case environmental determina-
tions could create major public policy which more properly should 
be decided by the legislature, the courts, perhaps correctly, have 
confined judicial review to an examination of whether NEPA's pro-
cedural requirements have been satisfied, and have declined to re-
view closely the substantive merits of impact statements. 
IV. CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION 
Congress has intervened in at least one major environmental dis-
pute-the Trans-Alaska Pipeline litigation-to wrest decisionmak-
ing power from the courts. Following a review of this controversy, 
this article will discuss alternative mechanisms for future congres-
sional action. 
The extensive history of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline dates from 
January, 1968, when oil was first discovered at Prudhoe Bay, on 
Alaska's North Slope.54 The North Slope field contained ten billion 
barrels of proven reserves, making it the largest proven field in 
North America.55 The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), a 
consortium of oil companies, proposed that the oil be transported 
by 48-inch pipe nearly 800 miles to an ice-free port in Southeastern 
Alaska and thence forwarded by tanker to West Coast markets. 56 
Mter TAPS applied for land use permits authorizing construction 
52 Id. at IV-93, citing Sedulus, How Dull the Advocates, NEW REpUBLIC 22 (May 25, 1970). 
" Comment, The Role of the Judiciary In the Confrontation With The Problems of Envi-
ronmental Quality, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1070, 1074-75 (1970). (Hereinafter cited as The Role 
of The Judiciary). 
" Atlantic-Humble Finds Oil on North Slope, ALASKA CONSTRUCTION AND OIL REPORT, 
(April, 1968), at 47. 
55 See Judicial Standards, supra note 20, at 1609. 
" Knott, The Pipeline Story-Or How the Caribou Came to Fame, BP SHIELD INT'L 8 (May, 
1970). 
--------- - ---
382 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 6:373 
of the Pipeline of June 10, 1969,57 the Department of the Interior 
prepared certain environmental requirements to be incorporated 
into the permits,58 lifted the "freeze" on Native-claimed land in 
Alaska so that rights-of-way could be granted,59 and prepared to 
issue a permit for the pipeline's haul road. 80 These permits would 
have been issued within a year,8! but NEPA and other litigation 
delayed issuance until January 23, 1974.82 Without congressional 
intervention in late 1973,63 litigation could have stalled the pipeline 
project for several additional years. 
Early in 1970, two groups of plaintiffs, representing Natives and 
environmentalists, petitioned the District Court for the District of 
Columbia for an injunction to prevent issuance of the pipeline ap-
provals. The Natives argued that the project theatened their tradi-
tional means of subsistence and that the government's approbation 
would violate both its fiduciary duties and NEPA.84 District Judge 
Hart granted an injunction prohibiting the issuance of a permit for 
a pipeline haul road over any Native-claimed land.85 Congress ulti-
mately resolved the Native claims problem by enacting the unprece-
dented Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,88 thereby extinguish-
ing any and all Native claims by payment of $962.5 million and 
forty million acres of Alaska landY 
Although the challenge by the Natives was resolved in late 1971,88 
a lawsuit filed by three conservationist organizations89 caused more 
extensive delay. The conservationists charged that the issuance of 
pipeline authorization permits would violate the width require-
ments prescribed for oil pipelines by the Mineral Leasing Act of 
" The application is included in Hearings on the Status of the Proposed Trans·Alaska 
Pipeline Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 
1, 103·06 (1969). 
OM Federal Task Force on Alaskan Oil Development, Stipulations for the Trans·Alaska 
Pipeline System, U.S. Dep't of the Interior (Sept., 1969). 
" P.L.O. 4760, 35 Fed. Reg. 424 (1970) . 
.. Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970) (findings of fact). 
" Id. at 423. 
'2 The Anchorage Times, "Oil & the Pipeline," January 8, 1977, at A·7, col. 3. 
" Trans·Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651 et seq. (Supp. III 1973) . 
.. The Anchorage Times, "Oil & the Pipeline," January 8, 1977, at A·4, col. 2·3 . 
.. Allakeet v. Hickel, Civil No. 706·70, 1 E.L.R. 65021 (D.D.C. 1970) . 
.. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (Supp. I 1971). 
" Id. ~ 1605. 
1M The Settlement Act probably would have been enacted at an earlier time had TAPS 
otherwise stood ready to proceed. 
" The Wilderness Society, Friends of the Earth, and Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. 
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192070 and that the project's EIS was substantively inadequate. 71 
Judge Hart, noting that the Department of the Interior stood ready 
to issue the haul road permit,72 concluded as a matter of law that 
such action would violate both NEPA and the Mineral Leasing Act. 
The court accordingly granted the preliminary injunction to prevent 
irreparable injury to the plaintiffs.73 
Judge Hart correctly found the EIS to be insufficient. Section 
102(2)(C) procedures had not been met, as the Department had 
neither prepared an EIS concerning the proposed sale to TAPS of 
gravel to be used in construction, nor addressed environmental 
aspects in the haul road impact statement.74 Interpreting the 
court's ruling as required an EIS dealing with the pipeline project 
as a whole,15 the Department commenced work on a more compre-
hensive impact statement. 
A preliminary version ofthe Draft Impact Statement, a document 
to be circulated among public agencies for informed comment,76 was 
completed in November, 1970, and published two months later.77 
Alyeska Pipeline Service, the successor in interest to TAPS, called 
the 200 page document "substantially more detailed than any pre-
viously drafted by a federal agency pursuant to NEPA. "78 In the 
public hearings that followed, a 10,000 page record, representing the 
testimony and statements of more than 2,500 individuals and organ-
izations, was developed. In response to the criticism voiced by many 
of the participants in the hearing process, the Department created 
a special §102 "Statement Task Force" to prepare a final EIS. The 
Task Force obtained information from the governments of the 
United States, Canada, and Alaska, and from representatives of 
private interests, examining land, marine, and alternative Cana-
dian routes. Alyeska simultaneously submitted a 29 volume Project 
7. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181 et seq. (1970). Section 185 provides: "Rights-of-way through the public 
lands ... may be granted [to cover] said pipeline and twenty-five feet on each side of the 
same.'! 
71 Dominick & Brody, The Alaska Pipeline: Wilderness Society v. Morton And The Trans-
Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 23 AMER. U. L. REv. 337, 341 n. 10 (1973). 
72 Wilderness Society v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422, 432 (D.D.C. 1970). 
73 [d. at 424. 
,. Judicial Standards, supra note 20, at 1612 n. 92. 
75 [d. 
" 42 U.S.C. § 4332(D)(iv) (1970). 
77 For a detailed historical account of the EIS, see Myers, Federal Decisionmaking And the 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline, 4 ECOLOGY L. Q. 915 (1975). 
1M Brief for Alyeska as Appellee at 24, Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (Herein-
after cited as Alyeska brieO. 
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Description containing specific data. The climax of this unprece-
dented environmental research effort was the Final EIS, a nine 
volume compendium7• covering intricate project essentials as well as 
numerous alternatives to the Trans-Alaska transportation system.80 
The Final EIS was published on March 20, 1972, and for 45 days 
thereafter comments were received from numerous public and pri-
vate sources. The Department of the Interior studied these massive 
materials and granted the pipeline permits on May 11, 1972, at the 
same time publishing a 45 page statement of reasons for approval. 81 
Judge Hart reviewed the Final EIS and ruled in an oral opinion82 
that the requirements of NEPA and the Mineral Leasing Act were 
met. The preliminary injunction was dissolved. However, the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that the Mineral Leas-
ing Act width requirements had been violated83 and enjoined on this 
ground alone the construction of the pipeline.84 Unfortunately, the 
court did not rule on the substantive adequacy of the Final EIS. 
Although the majority considered the EIS issue to be "remote" and 
rooted in disputed factual matters,85 three judges88 dissented on this 
question, stating that there was sufficient discussion of each alter-
native in the impact statement to meet NEPA requirements. 87 
As a consequence of the appellate court's failure to decide the 
NEPA compliance issue, that issue would have to be relitigated 
once Congress amended the Mineral Leasing Act to accomodate the 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline.88 Judge Wright, writing for the majority, 
admitted that such a delay might well invalidate the Final EIS: 
"Should amendment of the [Mineral Leasing] Act take several 
years, the analysis of environmental, economic, and other costs in 
" Three volumes consist of an Analysis of the Economic and Security Aspects of the Trans· 
Alaska Pipeline, six volumes are properly the Environmental Impact Statement . 
.. Among alternatives discussed were a reduction in energy consumption, increased oil 
imports, additional domestic oil production in areas other than the North Slope, modification 
of FPC natural gas pricing, nuclear stimulation of natural gas reservoirs, increased coal 
production, increased use and development of nuclear energy sources, and development of 
synthetic fossil fuel sources, of geothermal power, and of other advanced power generation 
techniques. Myers, supra note 77, at 937 . 
• , See Aleyeska brief, supra note 78, at 50·51. 
•• Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 4 Envt'l Rep. Cases 1467 (D.D.C. Aug. 15, 1970) . 
.. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973) . 
•• [d . 
.. [d. at 889·90 . 
.. Judges Robb and Wilkey joined in Judge McKinnon's concurring opinion. 
M7 Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1973) . 
.. Judge Wright, writing for the court, foresaw congressional intervention as to this matter, 
but was uncertain when it might take place. See 479 F. Supp. at 889. 
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the present Impact Statement may become outdated."89 Notwith-
standing this danger, the United States Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari,90 thereby foreclosing further review of the decision. 
Congress, recognizing the importance of the Alaskan project and 
wishing to avoid further NEPA litigation, speedily amended the 
Mineral Leasing Act9! and simultaneously approved the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act.92 This latter Act authorized the 
immediate issuance of the pipeline permits and eliminated judicial 
review of the Final Impact Statement.93 The judiciary had proven 
totally ineffective in resolving the Trans-Alaska problem, and con-
gressional intervention was necessary. This judicial failure, com-
pared with the legislative success in this grave problem, recom-
mends the advisability of the legislative decisionmaking approach 
to other major environmental policy decisions. 
V. LEGISLATIVE REMAND VS. PRE-EMPTION LEGISLATION 
A. The "Remand to Congress" and Its Deficiencies 
At the height of the pipeline controversy, one commentator pro-
posed that the litigation concerning the sufficiency of the Final 
Impact Statement take the form of a "remand to Congress."94 This 
approach would have had the court enjoin the issuance of the pipe-
line permits, remanding to Congress the decision whether to exempt 
the entire project from NEP A's requirements. 95 The idea of a legisla-
tive remand was first suggested by Professor Sax,96 who believed 
that public policy should not be made by the courts. He argued that 
the role of the courts is to ensure that the proper body is allowed to 
make a particular policy determination. v7 The judiciary in NEPA 
cases, therefore, need only determine whether Congress or the de-
fendant agency is best suited to approve a particular federal project. 
This method could be utilized whenever a federal agency cannot 
•• [d . 
.. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 411 U.S. 917 (1973). 
" Federal Lands Right-of-Way Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 576 (Nov. 16, 
1973), amending § 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970) . 
• 2 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651 et seq. (Supp. I 1971). 
03 [d. See text at note 100, infra. 
" Judicial Standards, supra note 20, at 1631-32 . 
.. [d. Senator Dominick later interpreted the court of appeals decision in Wilderness 
Society to be a "legislative remand." See Dominick & Brody, supra note 71, at 350 . 
.. J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT ch. 8 (1971). 
17 [d. 
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effectively comply with NEPA.98 Remand would occur only if Con-
gress is found better suited to render the decision. 
Nevertheless, the remand approach requires prolonged litigation. 
An EIS would have to be litigated until the highest available appel-
late court determined which authority, the agency involved or Con-
gress, is best equipped to authorize the project. In the Trans-Alaska 
controversy, however, the court of appeals enjoined the agency ap-
proval for failure to comply with a statute other than NEPA; that 
is, the Mineral Leasing Act. Standing alone, this did not constitute 
a true remand since NEPA litigation would have been reinstituted 
had Congress merely amended the Leasing Act. If the injunction 
were subsequently upheld on the basis of an EIS insufficiency, a 
"remand to Congress" might then have occurred. But, since Con-
gress resolved the NEPA issue before the EIS insufficiency was 
affirmed, the solution to the pipeline litigation was more properly a 
pre-emption by, not a remand to, Congress. 
The remand approach, while properly placing the power to make 
major environmental decisions in Congress, unfortunately requires 
a determination by the court of last resort that the particular case 
justifies congressional resolution. Consequently, the remand perpet-
uates those deficiencies of the judicial approach which pose such 
great obstacles to environmental litigation: expense and delay. On 
the other hand, the remand approach eliminates the problem of 
judicial inexpertise and prevents the formulation of major public 
policy by the courts. 
B. The Case for Pre-emption Legislation 
Pre-emption legislation, a modfication of the legislative remand, 
may be the best solution for controversies concerning the environ-
mental impact of crucial federal projects. Pre-emption legislation 
takes effect prior to judicial action, thus conclusively deciding the 
matter at hand and foreclosing further judicial intervention.99 This 
1M See Judicial Standards, supra note 20, at 1639 . 
.. One commentator considers the authorization act to be "constitutionally infirm." Com-
ment, The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 And The Energy Crisis: The Road to 
Alaska, 10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 265, 318 (1974). This view considers the authorization 
act to be a selective withdrawal of the right of particular environmental groups to litigate 
certain environmental issues and, hence, a violation of due proce88 and equal protection. [d. 
at 321. Congress' modification of its own statute does not infringe upon any constitutional 
guarantees. Due process protection is guaranteed by the combination of § 102(2)(C) proce-
dural requirements, while equal protection is assured by the fact that NEPA pre-emption 
legislation is directed to the Secretary of the Interior who represents every citizen. Dominick 
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alternative short-circuits those judicial deficiencies perpetuated by 
the legislative remand. Like the remand, however, it places the 
problem and its solution in the proper governmental sphere. 
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act which resolved the 
TAPS litigation is a prototype of NEPA pre-emption legislation. 
This Act prevented further review of the NEPA issue by ordering 
that: 
The actions ... which relate to the construction and completion of the 
pipeline system ... as described in the Final Environmental Impact 
Statement of the Department of Interior, shall be taken without further 
action under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969; and the 
actions ... shall not be subject to judicial review. 100 
This resolution justifiably prevented further hazardous and costly 
delay of the project, eliminated the problem of judicial inexper-
tise,IOI and ensured the progress of a vital national undertaking. l02 
However, the misfortune of the Authorization Act is that Congress 
waited so long to wrest from the courts an issue of such national and 
international importance. Since the Actl03 overruled all that the 
courts had taken a necessarily long time to decide, much time and 
expense could have been saved had Congress acted earlier. Pre-
emption legislation is most advantageous when it anticipates, 
rather than responds to, litigation. In the future, Congress should 
be more willing to undertake a major role in environmental policy-
making where large-scale projects substantially affect the national 
interest. Nonetheless, pre-emption legislation is too cumbersome 
a process to be used in all cases of federal environmental decision-
making. The problem, then, is to delimit those situations in which 
pre-emption should be employed. 
Factors which indicate the appropriateness of the remand ap-
& Brody, supra note 71, at 370. Further, Congress has inherent power to manage the public 
lands under Art. IV, § 3 of the Constitution. 
'00 43 U.S.C. § 1652(a) (Supp. I 1971). 
'0' Judicial inexpertise would have been a relatively minor concern in any relitigation of 
Wilderness Society because both District Judge Hart and the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals judges possess great familiarity with environmental disputes. 
'" Congress' findings of fact indicate that the "arbitrary and capricious" test had, in fact, 
been met by the project's Final Impact Statement: 
The Department of the Interior and other Federal agencies, have, over a long period of 
time, conducted extensive studies of the technical aspects end of the environmental, 
social, and economic impacts of the proposed trans-Alaska oil pipeline, including consid-
eration of a trans-Canada pipeline. 
43 U.S.C. §1651(b) (Supp. I 1971). 
,03 In conjunction with the amendment of the Mineral Leasing Act. 
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proach are of limited value in determining the efficacy of the pre-
emption approach. One commentator suggests that a legislative 
remand "has in effect stated that there are situations which may 
arise from time to time which require an exemption from the strin-
gent requirements of NEPA."104 This theory would limit remand to 
problems of "great magnitude"105 to which Congress had previously 
devoted a great deal of attention. lOG Another writer lists seven factors 
to be balanced by a court when considering a remand to Congress: 
the extent of permissible administrative discretion, the magnitude 
of the threatened harm to the environment, the size of the project, 
the degree of sophistication of available project data, the amount 
of time and money already spent on attempted compliance with 
NEPA, the number of unsatisfactory prior impact statements, and 
procedural good faith.l07 Both of these formulations, however, are 
based on hindsight-the former looking to demonstrated congres-
sional experience in the area, and the latter focusing upon the prior 
history of the particular project. Such factors, while useful in a 
remand situation, do not provide the necessary prediction required 
in a pre-emption decision. 
Pre-emption legislation must be able to anticipate problems. A 
determination that pre-emption is proper should be based upon a 
prediction that a federal project will best proceed if Congress takes 
immediate and final action. Early consideration of "looking for-
ward" factors, including project size, administrative discretion, 
threatened harm to the environment, available information, and 
anticipated savings of time and money, as well as administrative 
expertise, urgency of the project, and the extent to which the arbiter 
will be molding significant public policy, should enable Congress to 
correctly decide whether pre-emption is warranted. 
If a lesson was taught by the TAPS litigation, the nation's legisla-
tors learned it well, for Congress wisely adopted a pre-emption ap-
proach with regard to the proposed Alaska "Natural Gas" Transpor-
tation System. Foreseeing the need for a governmental decision con-
cerning the transportation of North Slope natural gas to domestic 
markets,108 Title III of the Authorization Act directed the Interior 
'01 Dominick & Brody, supra note 71, at 361. 
... [d. at 362. 
, .. [d. at 363. 
,01 Judicial Standards, supra note 20, at 1637-38. 
, .. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, ALASKAN NATURAL GAS TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, A REPORT 
To THE CONGRESS PURSUANT To PUBUC LAW 93-153 (December, 1975), at 1. 
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Department to investigate the feasibility of natural gas pipeline 
transportation systems through Alaska and Canada. 109 After review-
ing the findings of the requested study,IIO Congress set up a compre-
hensive mechanism "for making a sound decision as to the selection 
of a transportation system for delivery of Alaska natural gas" 11 I and 
eliminated judicial review of project impact statements. 
The enactment of a joint resolution under section 719f of this title 
approving the decision of the President shall be conclusive as to the legal 
and factual sufficiency of the environmental impact statements submit-
ted by the President relative to the approved transportation system and 
no court shall have jurisdiction to consider questions respecting the 
sufficiency of such statements under the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969.112 
The Prudhoe Bay field holds the largest proven natural gas re-
serve in North America,1I3 and "[ t]he magnitude of the physical 
undertaking and cost of building a gas transportation system from 
Alaska apparently exceeds any prior U.S. private undertaking."1U 
When Congress took action, three routes were under consideration, 
each with a massive EIS. Pre-emption in this case was, therefore, 
particularly appropriate. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 was designed to 
incorporate environmental considerations into the process by which 
federal agencies recommend and implement major federal projects. 
Nevertheless, judicial review of environmental impact statements 
has failed to promote environmental quality in large-scale under-
takings. Congress must be prepared to decide major environmental 
decisions itself where to do so would best serve the interests of 
economy, efficiency and public policy. NEPA should not be served 
at the expense of democratic decisionmaking, particularly where 
strict adherence to the Act would result in needless litigation. Early 
pre-emption of NEPA review for crucial federal projects should be-
come a standard tool of legislative policymaking. 
I.' 43 V.S.C. ~ 1651 (Supp. I 1971). 
110 See Judicial Standards, supra note 20. 
III Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act, 15 V.S.C.A. §§ 719 et seq. (Supp. 1976). 
112 [d. § 719(c)(3). 
113 El Paso Alaska Company, et. al., Docket No. CP75-96, Federal Power Commission 
(Initial Decision On Competing Applications For An Alaskan Natural Gas Transportation 
Project) (Feb. 1, 1977), at 7. 
"' [d. at 9. 
